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In the 1990s, Argentina received large amounts of foreign
direct investment and the participation of multinational
companies in the country’s economy increased significantly.
As during the import substitution industrialization period,
the basic goal of multinationals is still to exploit the domestic
market. Two differences from that period can be observed,
however: access to the Brazilian market allows for greater
economies of scale and specialization, and increased
competition in many tradable sectors is forcing subsidiaries
to bring their operations closer to international best practice.
These differences, though, are not reflected in the trading
practices of subsidiaries. Although these have considerably
higher import ratios than local firms, differences in the export
ratios of the two types of companies are not statistically
significant.
Multinationals’ manufacturing exports go mainly to
Mercosur, while their imports come principally from the
developed countries.
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One of the most striking features of the Argentine
economy during the 1990s was the large influx of
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the resultant increase
in the presence of multinational companies in the
country’s market. Although Argentina had received
large flows of investment of this kind at different stages
in its history, particularly in the late 1950s and early
1960s, when the “hard” part of import substitution
industrialization (ISI) began, there are a number of
aspects of the recent FDI surge that make it unusual and
particularly important.
Firstly, the largest FDI inflows seen in Argentina
prior to the 1990s were between 1959 and 1963, when
they averaged US$ 464 million a year in today’s money.
In the 1990s, investment inflows of this kind averaged
more than US$ 6.76 billion a year. While FDI ran at
about 0.3% of GDP between 1959 and 1963, it exceeded
2% almost every year in the 1990s. In fact, Argentina
is one of the few developing countries to attract
significant flows of foreign investment: between 1994
and 1999 it ranked fourth as an FDI recipient among
developing countries, after China, Brazil and Mexico.
Consequently, the presence of multinationals1 in
the Argentine economy is also much greater than it was
in the past. To take the largest manufacturing firms,
whereas in 1963 multinationals accounted for 46% of
value-added and 36% of employment, in 1997 the
figures were 79% and 61%, respectively. Again, the
share of multinationals in the total sales of the 100
largest manufacturing firms rose from 43% in 1974 to
61% in 1998. Indeed, the advance of multinationals in
the 1990s puts them among the clear “winners” in the
restructuring that has taken place in the Argentine
economy since the adoption of the Convertibility Plan
and the implementation of a far-reaching programme
of pro-market structural reform, which has drastically
changed the ground rules of the country’s economy.
Secondly, and essentially as a result of the reform
programme just referred to, the domestic context has
altered greatly. Whereas during the import substitution
industrialization phase the Argentine economy was
virtually closed to imports that competed with local
output, from the late 1980s onward significant progress
was made towards freer trade, including integration with
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in Mercosur.
Thirdly, during the substitution phase FDI went first
and foremost into the manufacturing sector, while in
the 1990s services played a much greater role as the
weight of the industrial sector in the economy
diminished. Again, whereas FDI during the import
substitution period went mainly into greenfield
investments, in the 1990s the bulk of investment went
into purchases of existing companies (including
privatized public-sector companies).
Lastly, the international context too is different
from what it was in the past. Although FDI flows around
the world expanded substantially in the 1950s and
1960s, in the 1990s there was a greater impetus towards
globalization, one of whose most distinctive features
has been the rapid growth of FDI. Measured at current
values, world FDI flows increased from an annual
average of US$ 115 billion in 1984-1989 to an average
of some US$ 500 billion in 1994-1999. Globalization
has also led to qualitative changes in the logic of FDI
deployment, such as the growing importance of mergers
and acquisitions and the reshaping of intracompany
relationships to achieve greater linkage between the
different subsidiaries and their head offices, not only
commercially but also as regards technology and
production methods.
Given this context, it is clearly important to analyse
the determinants, types and effects of the great influx
of FDI that went into Argentina in the 1990s.
Chudnovsky and López (2001) present the results of a
research project that looked into these issues. In the
present article, which partly draws on that work, the
This article is based on the findings of a research project that
was completed in March 2001 in the Mercosur Network, with
financing from the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) of Canada and the Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica
y Tecnológica in Argentina. The authors wish to thank Laura
Abramovsky for her valuable assistance in collecting and processing
the statistical material used in this paper.
1 The term “multinational” is used here to refer to all companies
that have more than 10% of their share capital held by non-residents
(following the IMF criterion that uses the 10% threshold to
distinguish between portfolio investment and direct investment).
In fact, most of the multinationals operating in Argentina are more
than 50% foreign-owned.
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analytical objectives are more narrowly defined, and
the essential aim is to consider the extent to which the
strategies and behaviour of the subsidiaries of
multinationals in the new circumstances of the 1990s
differed from what had been seen in the substitution
industrialization period.
During ISI, the basic motivation of multinational
companies investing in Argentina was the desire to
exploit the protected domestic market (“jumping the
tariff”).2 Their subsidiaries had little production
complementation and/or linkage with their peers
elsewhere in the company, and the little they exported
went mainly to Latin American markets. They imported
quite substantially, however, mainly goods that could
not be produced locally because of the scales or the
degree of technological complexity involved. These
imports came mainly from the home countries of their
parent companies, and from other developed countries.
These subsidiaries performed better in terms of
productivity, technology assets, etc., than locally owned
firms, but because they were operating in an
environment that offered relatively few incentives for
technical progress and efficiency-seeking, the
technologies and productivity levels they worked with
tended to fall further and further behind international
best practice. In certain respects, in short, the
subsidiaries of multinationals showed a tendency to
accentuate the main problems of the substitution
model.3
By contrast, in the new circumstances of the 1990s
the expectation, particularly among orthodox
economists, was that FDI would be not only a source of
balance-of-payments financing, but also a key element
in the restructuring of the domestic economy to raise
its efficiency and level of integration with the world
economy. This type of reasoning is embodied in the
World Development Report 1991 (World Bank, 1991),
where many of the ideas and recommendations of the
so-called Washington Consensus were developed.
According to the World Bank, FDI leads to losses of
welfare when it is carried out in countries that follow
“distorting” policies, such as high levels of import
protection (as in the case of ISI). In open economies
with investor-friendly laws, by contrast, multinationals
abandon their old focus on the domestic market,
increase their exports by exploiting their links with
international markets, and at the same time increase
their productivity rapidly (World Bank, 1991). The
argument that multinationals stimulate export growth
in recipient economies is also found in the World
Development Report 1999/2000 (World Bank, 2000).
To sum up, the expectation was that multinationals
would not aggravate economic weaknesses as they had
during ISI, but would help to strengthen the potentialities
of the economic regime adopted in the 1990s.
In earlier studies (Chudnovsky, Porta and others,
1996 and Chudnovsky and López, 1996) we found that
multinationals played a much more limited role in
export growth than this orthodox view maintained, and
that their strategies continued to focus mainly on the
domestic market, although they were indeed more
efficient than companies operating under the
substitution industrialization model. Now that more
time has passed since the reforms began, and new
empirical evidence has been analysed, the findings of
the present study bear out the results of our previous
research.
Given this situation, this article sets out to answer
the following questions. To what extent do the strategies
and objectives of multinational companies differ, in the
context of an economy that is more open now than in
the past, from those that prevailed during the
substitution industrialization phase? If there are
differences, how did they manifest themselves in the
external trade patterns of these companies’ subsidiaries
in the 1990s? And in particular, have multinationals
altered their trading strategies along the lines predicted
by the orthodox theory?
2 Even in the days when the agricultural export model prevailed,
of course, there were multinationals in Argentina engaged in
exploiting natural resources, chiefly agricultural, with a view to
export. Although this type of operation not only continued but
expanded during the import substitution stage, the purpose of most
of the FDI that arrived then was to exploit the domestic market.
3 See Sourrouille, Gatto and Kosacoff (1984), Sourrouille,
Lucangeli and Kosacoff (1985) and Kosacoff and Aspiazu (1989).
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II
The strategies of multinational companies
To analyse the strategies and operating methods adopted
by multinationals in Argentina in the 1990s, we shall
rely mainly on the conceptual framework provided by
the so-called “eclectic paradigm” of foreign direct
investment (Dunning, 1988 and 1996). This classifies
FDI by purpose into four main types:
i) Resource-seeking investment. This seeks to
exploit natural resources or unskilled labour, whose
availability is obviously the main locational advantage
offered by the recipient country. Investments of this
type are generally export-oriented and tend to operate
as enclaves within the host country.
ii) Market-seeking investment. This aims to exploit
the domestic market of the recipient country (and
sometimes the markets of other countries nearby). The
size and growth rate of the market, the existence of
physical barriers and/or high transport costs and the
industrialization strategy of the recipient country,
including decisions about the degree of protection for
local output, are decisive factors for this type of FDI,
which was the dominant one in Latin America during
the ISI phase.
iii) Efficiency-seeking investment. This type of
investment tends to follow the previous type as
competition conditions are modified by economic
development, trade liberalization or the emergence of
local competitors. Its aim is to rationalize production
in order to exploit economies of specialization and
scope. Regional integration, falling transport costs and
advances in telecommunications favour this type of
investment, which generally goes into trade and
production activities designed to complement the
operations of the multinational company’s
subsidiaries.
iv) Strategic asset-seeking. It seems that FDI of the
first two types is now yielding primacy to investment
of this fourth type. “The main purpose [of this type of
strategy] is to acquire resources and capabilities that
an investing firm believes will sustain or advance its
core competencies in regional or global markets. These
assets may range from innovatory capability and
organisational structures to accessing foreign
distribution channels and a better appreciation of the
needs of consumers in unfamiliar markets” (Dunning,
1996, p. 36).
In turn, shifts in multinationals’ strategies and
objectives have given rise to changes in the way their
subsidiaries fit into the company’s operations. Thus,
market-seeking strategies led on to the creation of stand-
alone subsidiaries. These reproduce the organization
of the parent company on a smaller scale, generally
with the exception of research and development
activities, which tend to be concentrated in the home
country (UNCTAD, 1994).
As cost competition begins to prevail in certain
industries, national consumption patterns converge and
transport costs fall, there is a shift in some cases to
“simple integration” strategies, in which the subsidiary
specializes in certain stages of the value chain (usually
labour-intensive ones) as part of the outsourcing
arrangements established by the company. This type of
strategy obviously tends to increase the volume of
external trade generated by FDI, as subsidiaries not only
export much of their output, but generally operate with
only a low level of national integration. Lastly, UNCTAD
(1994) speaks of what it terms a “complex integration”
strategy, in which multinationals turn their subsidiaries
into an integral part of regionally or globally integrated
distribution and production networks. Thus, the value
chain is broken down into functions (assembly, finance,
research and development, marketing, etc.) that are
situated wherever they can be carried out most efficiently
for the company as a whole. In this way, production and
management functions of strategic importance to the
company may be based in subsidiaries.
To analyse the strategies of multinationals in the
case of Argentina, a range of indicators bearing on the
external trade of their subsidiaries was studied, and a
typology of strategies by sector was generated on the
basis of this examination. In this way it was possible to
establish four groupings that differ essentially
depending on the types of sector involved in each case
and their greater or lesser propensity to export, but that
also display specific characteristics in their approach
to Mercosur, among other factors (table 1).4
4 The sample from which the data included in this table were
calculated were the 1,000 largest Argentine firms by sales in 1992
and 1997. The sales of companies in this sample represented 35%
and 44% of GDP, respectively.
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TABLE 1
Subsidiaries of multinational companies in Argentina: a sectoral typology
of their strategies, 1992 and 1997
(Percentages and millions of dollars)
1997 1992
X ratioa M ratioa X to M from X ratio Trade % X ratioa X to X ratio
Mercosurb Mercosurb without balance salesd Mercosurb without
Mercosurc (mill. dol.) Mercosurc
Total 15.0 18.8 50.6 19.5 9.3 802 100.0 17.6 30.3 14.8
Resource-seeking strategy 71.8 2.1 22.5 8.0 59.2 5,746 12.2 71.3 8.6 64.9
Fisheries 87.8 2.9 2.1 0.0 86.1 137 0.3 64.7 0.1 64.6
Oils and grains 84.5 1.0 16.4 12.7 69.6 4,570 8.2 88.4 17.2 72.9
Commodities marketinge 81.6 2.9 7.2 2.8 75.2 180 0.5 81.2 0.6 80.8
Leather and manufactures thereof 76.2 8.3 5.3 22.8 73.2 194 0.4 64.5 33.1 42.7
Petroleum 45.3 1.6 54.0 1.2 26.9 522 2.3 15.4 0.0 15.4
Meat products 44.1 1.8 21.7 1.6 30.9 143 0.5 53.9 0.4 53.6
Domestic market-seeking
strategy 0.8 16.2 12.6 11.0 0.7 -2,227 38.1 1.7 22.0 1.6
Import trade with technical
assistance componentf 4.7 41.2 12.5 6.5 4.4 -471 1.3 4.0 19.7 3.8
Electricity, gas and water 0.8 5.1 12.0 10.5 0.7 -134 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Construction and engineering 0.1 2.9 8.1 6.5 0.1 -9 0.3 0.7 14.9 0.6
Telephony services 0.1 24.2 n.c. 2.5 0.1 -774 9.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wholesale and retail trade 0.1 32.1 n.c. 20.8 0.1 -675 11.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
Transport and storage 0.0 3.0 n.c. 2.0 0.0 -71 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Television and multimedia 0.0 7.4 n.c. 0.1 0.0 -67 1.1 – – –
Other services 0.0 1.6 n.c. 11.0 0.0 -26 2.8 0.2 36.0 0.1
Moderate-export market-seeking
strategy 15.9 29.0 59.8 27.7 6.1 -1,682 25.8 10.5 40.6 7.4
Cars and car parts 24.8 31.7 69.3 40.7 4.3 -334 12.8 11.1 37.5 8.9
Textiles and wearing apparel 17.5 32.1 91.3 56.3 1.5 -6 0.2 14.4 52.2 12.4
Cellulose and paper 15.1 17.2 60.6 24.9 9.5 -14 1.5 4.3 42.4 3.6
Chemical and petrochemical industry 14.6 27.2 53.9 22.5 7.9 -757 8.2 11.8 37.6 8.1
Plastic and rubber products industry 11.2 31.1 63.2 30.6 3.1 -170 1.0 2.3 50.6 1.1
Engineering and machinery 10.3 30.1 57.0 20.2 4.8 -194 1.1 12.5 48.6 7.7
Home electrical/consumer electronics 10.0 38.3 80.2 17.8 1.8 -207 1.0 0.1 46.9 0.1
Low-export market-seeking strategy 6.7 16.6 62.0 19.9 2.3 -1,052 23.4 5.3 40.0 2.9
Glass and non-metallic minerals 9.1 10.2 51.2 21.0 3.8 -11 1.0 6.2 25.1 4.4
Electrical and electronic
equipment and machinery 7.5 34.6 53.2 16.8 2.8 -383 2.2 7.3 39.2 4.5
Food, beverages and tobacco 7.3 9.5 61.0 27.3 2.2 -18 10.1 5.9 38.6 2.3
Pharmaceutical industry 6.0 3.5 68.3 6.8 1.7 -518 2.2 4.0 53.5 2.6
Fuels and petroleum derivatives 4.8 7.4 72.0 16.8 2.0 -87 7.5 3.1 30.6 2.2
Publishing/graphics industry 2.9 19.7 97.3 17.0 0.1 -35 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of external trade statistics.
a All ratios calculated as an average of individual company ratios. X = exports, M = imports.
b Exports (imports) to (from) Mercosur as a percentage of total exports (imports).
c Exports to non-Mercosur destinations as a percentage of total sales.
d Sales of each sector as a percentage of total sales by multinationals.
e Includes wool, fruit, etc.
f This category covers companies that distribute imported goods (essentially goods connected with information technology and
telecommunications and inputs for the agricultural sector) and that, in addition to marketing, provide technical assistance services to
purchasers. This category was introduced to distinguish operations of this type from others where the activity is exclusively commercial
(retail trade, household goods stores, etc.).
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One group with very well defined characteristics
is the group of sectors in which resource-seeking FDI
predominates, attracted by Argentina’s natural
comparative advantages. In 1997, companies in this
grouping (which is much the smallest one) accounted
for 12% of the total turnover of the multinationals
ranking among the country’s 1,000 largest firms. Of
the four groups, this resource-seeking one is the only
one to show a trade surplus. It includes companies that
are clearly oriented towards the external market (the
average export ratio is in excess of 70%, and they
generally export over 50% of sales), and that operate
with very low import levels. Mercosur provides only a
very small proportion of these companies’ few imports,
and although it is a fairly important market for exports
(particularly of petroleum and, to a lesser extent, of
oils and grains and meat products), in 1997 the non-
Mercosur export ratio of this group of sectors (i.e.,
exports outside the area as a percentage of each
company’s total sales) averaged about 60%. It may be
imagined that the subsidiaries of multinationals in this
category are only loosely integrated into their parent
companies and that inter-subsidiary complementation
and/or specialization strategies are uncommon. Each
subsidiary’s operating links with the rest of the company
consist essentially in exports of commodities from
Argentina, which implies that the dominant operating
methodologies in this group of companies are of the
stand-alone type.
The other extreme as regards market orientation is
found in sectors whose strategies are purely market-
seeking: trade, services, transport, construction. This
grouping is the largest one, accounting for 38% of all
sales by the multinationals ranking among Argentina’s
largest companies. The multinationals operating in these
sectors hardly export at all, and only a few industries
have high import coefficients (imports of final goods
in the case of trade, and essentially of equipment and
inputs in the case of telephony services). For them,
Mercosur is not by and large a significant source of
imports. The companies in this grouping run a large
trade deficit, since although their average import ratio
is not particularly high by the standards of
multinationals in Argentina generally, their exports, as
mentioned above, are virtually nil. Strong inter-
subsidiary integration and/or specialization strategies
seem to be equally lacking here, at least in goods trade,
although consideration should be given to the possibility
that such strategies might be found in other areas (such
as television, multimedia or telephony services). In any
event, the evidence available indicates that in this
grouping, as in the previous one, it is stand-alone
strategies that predominate.
The other two groupings (market-seeking sectors
with low exports and market-seeking sectors with
moderate exports) include industrial sectors whose main
focus is on the domestic market. In 1997, each of these
two groups accounted for about 25% of all sales by the
multinationals ranking among the country’s largest
companies. The distinction between the two was
established on the basis of the average export ratio of
the Argentine economy in 1997, which was a little over
9%. Thus, sectors whose ratios were similar to or lower
than the national average were classified as low-export
sectors, while those activities whose export ratios were
higher than this average were classed as moderate
exporters, the year taken being 1997 in all cases.
Many of the low-export sectors are producers of
consumer goods (pharmaceuticals, food, drinks and
tobacco), and product differentiation, be it by branding,
technical characteristics, advertising or other aspects,
is crucial to the way they compete. The electrical and
electronic equipment and machinery sector also
produces some consumer goods for markets with
similar forms of dominant competition. This type of
competition is also important in fuels and petroleum
derivatives. Multinationals operating in these sectors
have an average export ratio of 6.7%, which is well
below their average import ratio of 16.6%;
unsurprisingly, then, the operations of this group
generate a large trade deficit. Table 1 shows that in the
electrical and electronic equipment and machinery
sector and the pharmaceutical sector, the import ratio
is about five times the export ratio on average, and in
the publishing and graphics industries it is over six
times. Mercosur takes 62% on average of what
companies in this group export. Thus, we find that
exports beyond Mercosur average a bare 2.3% of low-
export market-seeking multinationals’ sales. The
percentage of imports sourced from Mercosur is much
lower at 20%.
Lastly, in the group of sectors that export
moderately (but are still focused on the domestic
market) there is a discernible tendency to follow more
open external trade strategies and to seek strong
integration with Mercosur, particularly where exports
are concerned. The average export ratio of these
companies (16%) is lower than their import ratio (29%).
As a result, they run a large trade deficit, particularly
in the chemicals/petrochemicals sector.
Even the sectors in this more export-oriented group
basically concentrate on Mercosur, and non-Mercosur
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 6  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 2
THE STRATEGIES OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES IN 1990S ARGENTINA  •  DANIEL CHUDNOVSKY AND ANDRÉS LÓPEZ
157
exports average just 6.1% of sales. Only in the
chemicals/petrochemicals and cellulose/paper sectors
does the non-Mercosur export ratio exceed this, while
sectors such as household electrical appliances/
consumer electronics and textiles export almost
exclusively to Mercosur. In other words, manufacturing
multinationals are now following market-seeking
strategies in the broader ambit of Mercosur, but export
very little to markets beyond it (4.4% is the average for
all subsidiaries in this group).
What happens when we compare the indicators for
1992 with those for 1997? Two groups show little
change: the resource-seeking group of sectors (although
the proportion of exports going to Mercosur increased)
and the purely market-seeking group of sectors. In both
low-export and moderate-export manufacturing sectors,
the average export coefficient rose (most markedly in
those sectors that exported moderately in 1997) and
the proportion of external sales going to Mercosur
increased sharply. Thus, in both groupings the share of
non-Mercosur markets in total sales tended to fall
between 1992 and 1997. In other words, whereas
consideration of changes in export ratios might give
the impression that the strategies of multinationals
became less market-seeking between those two years,
when the Mercosur dimension is brought in we find
that the opposite was what tended to happen, since non-
Mercosur exports as a proportion of total sales were
lower in 1997 than in 1992. The only exceptions to this
general rule were the chemicals/petrochemicals sector
and, very marginally, the household electrical/consumer
electronics sector and the plastic and rubber products
industry.5
The evidence that market-seeking strategies are
strongly dominant in the subsidiaries of multinational
companies is consistent with the findings of previous
studies into the subject (Chudnovsky, Porta and others,
1996; Kosacoff and Porta, 1997 and Porta, 1999), which
also agree that the size and growth rate of the domestic
market were the main attractions for FDI going into
Argentina in the 1990s. As was noted in the
introduction, the same was true of the strategies and
determinants of FDI in the ISI stage. There are two
significant differences, however, from the dynamic that
prevailed in that period.
Firstly, as has just been noted, the market that
multinationals are trying to succeed in is not just the
Argentine one, but in many cases the wider regional
market, Mercosur. This offers scope, in principle, for
greater economies of scale and specialization and hence
greater efficiency than in the ISI phase. According to
the standard literature, it is essentially through
efficiency-seeking strategies (of which more later) that
these gains can be realized.
Secondly, at a time of freer trade market-seeking
strategies need to include rationalization and
modernization measures designed to improve the
productivity and quality of local processes and products.
Earlier studies (Chudnovsky, Porta and others, 1996
and Kosacoff and Porta, 1997) show that multinationals
have indeed taken action of this type, although
efficiency gains have not always been passed on
“downstream” to customers or consumers. Whether this
has happened or not has generally depended on whether
there is real competition in the markets concerned
(something that is not always guaranteed by trade
liberalization alone) and/or whether there are effective
systems of regulation to constrain the ability of
companies in particular sectors to abuse their dominant
position (this is a crucial issue for privatization; in the
case of Argentina, the scope of regulatory requirements
and the degree of enforcement have varied very greatly
among the different sectors involved).
The need for the subsidiaries of multinationals to
implement efficiency measures is part of the
restructuring process seen in the Argentine productive
sector in the 1990s. Multinationals, it should be
remembered, have been in a privileged position
because of their greater technological and financial
capabilities, their ability to use the know-how and
experience accrued in other subsidiaries of the
company to rationalize and modernize local structures,
and the ease with which they can take advantage of
freer trade through intracompany trade flows. Thus,
multinationals have mainly led what Kosacoff (ed.,
1998) has defined as “offensive restructurings”,
making what have often been large investments and
implementing profound organizational changes, as a
result of which they have secured major productivity
improvements that have brought them closer to
international best practice.
These efficiency measures, though, do not always
form part of efficiency-seeking strategies as defined by
Dunning. When forced to reduce costs (by trade
liberalization), the subsidiaries of multinationals may
implement rationalization or efficiency measures that
5 To ascertain how far the changes in the indicators referred to
were due to shifts in the strategies of existing multinationals or to
the entrance of new “players”, a homogeneous panel of companies
was analysed (i.e., companies operating both in 1992 and in 1997).
In general, the results were consistent with the exercise just
described, and bore out its conclusions.
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do not necessarily involve closer links with other
subsidiaries of the same company.
Efficiency-seeking strategies are taking on greater
importance as well, however, particularly within
Mercosur. Many multinationals operating in tradable
sectors have tended or are tending to adopt a strategy
of specialization in certain products or lines of
production, and of complementation with other
subsidiaries of the same company (particularly those
operating in Brazil), shaping a production function that
is open in respect of processes (inputs) and products.
Kosacoff and Porta (1997) detected the presence
of strategies with efficiency-seeking components in
certain sectors, namely food and beverages (branded
products), cleaning and toiletry articles, household
electrical appliances, packaging and cars and car parts.
These strategies, logically enough, were implemented
more quickly by “newcomers”, whose planning
included specialization and complementation among
subsidiaries from the outset, than among established
firms. With the latter, the specialization process began
with the importation, generally from another subsidiary
of the multinational concerned, of finished products to
extend the variety of supply or test the market, or of
inputs to bring down the cost of local production, while
progress towards specialization systems based on
relocation of activities among subsidiaries was at an
early stage, and varied among the different companies
and sectors studied. Thus, it was no surprise to find
that in many cases trade flows of this type were still
heavily dependent on demand cycles in the local
markets concerned.
Examination of current trade flows by company
and by sector yields new evidence that use is being made
of specialization strategies designed to improve
efficiency. This is clear from the fact that a number of
companies’ exports are heavily concentrated in one or
just a few product lines (and are heavily focused on
Mercosur, as was mentioned earlier), while imports of
both inputs and finished goods are very diverse.
It is only in the automotive industry, though, that
solid, efficiency-oriented integration strategies, mainly
within Mercosur, seem to be becoming the rule. This is
chiefly the result of two factors: i) the importance that
Mercosur has taken on in the globalized competition
among the major car manufacturers, and ii) the
existence of different regimes for car production
activities in Argentina and Brazil, which have
encouraged specialization and integration between the
two countries’ industries.
In other sectors, specialization strategies still seem
to depend on macroeconomic fluctuations, as has been
seen since the devaluation of the real in January 1999
and the long recession that began in Argentina in late
1998. These events have led a number of multinationals
to shut down production lines or even whole plants in
Argentina, with production being shifted in many cases
to Brazil.
As efficiency-seeking strategies begin to be
implemented, so at the same time a gradual shift is
taking place from the type of stand-alone subsidiaries
characteristic of ISI to working methods based on forms
of simple integration. The evidence available indicates
that, by and large, greater integration is confined almost
entirely to part of the product range on offer and does
not include transfer of any of the multinational’s
strategic functions. In particular, Argentine subsidiaries
do not carry out research and development or process
and product design in-house, and they are given only
partial responsibility for marketing and market
development activities (Kosacoff and Porta, 1997).
These authors maintain that the simple integration
taking place in industries such as branded foods,
cleaning and toiletry articles, household electrical
appliances and car parts is weak, and only in the
automotive sector, where efficiency-seeking strategies
are more highly developed, do strong forms of
integration appear to be emerging.
Lastly, asset-seeking strategies focus on the
acquisition of existing companies. It is found that,
generally speaking, the market position of the company
being taken over has mattered far more as an investment
determinant than its level of equipment. Multinationals
acquiring public service enterprises did not generally
set a high value either on the physical and technological
assets nor on the human capital that these had before
privatization (Chudnovsky, Porta and others, 1996). In
any event, the strategic character of the assets sought
by some multinationals to invest in depends essentially
on these companies’ operations in Argentina or, at most,
in Mercosur, and they are rarely strategic for the global
performance of the company concerned.
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III
The external trade of multinational companies
In the previous section we ascertained that the
subsidiaries of multinationals tend to export little –and
less than they import– and that their external trade,
particularly exports, is largely bound up with Mercosur.
We now need to look a little more closely at the trading
patterns of companies of this kind, and contrast them
with those of locally owned companies operating in
Argentina.
To what extent does the trade performance of
multinationals resemble or differ from that of local
ones? The information available reveals a striking
contrast in the trade balances of the two types of firms.
In 1997, when the Argentine balance of trade was in
deficit by US$ 2.126 billion (using FOB values for both
imports and exports and taking the 1,000 companies
with the largest sales), we find that multinationals had
a surplus of US$ 803 million, while local firms had a
surplus of US$ 5.042 billion (table 2). Excluding
companies that exported commodities or products with
a low degree of processing (oils, grains, leather, meat
products, fish, petroleum, wool, fruit, etc.),
multinationals ran a deficit of US$ 4.943 billion in 1997.
By contrast, if the same exercise is carried out for locally
owned companies, the outcome is still a positive trade
balance of US$ 991 million.
Part of the explanation for the tendency of
multinationals (excluding those that export
commodities or products with a low degree of
processing) to run trade deficits could lie in the
difference between their sectoral distribution and that
of local companies. Thus, we find that sectors
dominated by multinationals, such as the automotive
and car parts sector or the telephony services sector,
have large trade deficits. In a number of sectors,
however, multinational companies run deficits while
local ones run surpluses or much smaller deficits,
examples being chemicals/petrochemicals, electrical
and electronic equipment and machinery,
pharmaceuticals, and foods, beverages and tobacco.
Again, other than in sectors producing commodities or
goods with a low degree of processing, the import ratios
of multinationals in all industries are higher than their
export ratios. The same is not true of domestic firms,
which export more than they import in the food,
beverages and tobacco, fuel, electrical equipment and
machinery, iron, steel and aluminium and chemicals/
petrochemicals industries. In other words, although the
“sector” variable may be important in explaining the
differences between the trade balances of the two types
of companies, the “origin of capital” variable is
significant too, meaning that multinationals may have
a tendency to generate negative trade balances
irrespective of the business they are in.
Again, taking the 1,000 largest firms by sales,
multinationals had higher export ratios on average than
local ones in both 1992 and 1997 (table 2). This
tendency holds if the most export-oriented sectors are
excluded (those working with agricultural or mineral
commodities), although when this is done there is a
very significant diminution in the export orientation of
the leading Argentine companies. If commodity sectors
are excluded from the 1997 figures, the average export
ratio of subsidiaries of multinationals is just 8.1%, while
that of local firms is 4.2%.
It can also be seen that the export orientation of
both domestic and multinational firms weakened
between 1992 and 1997. This can mainly be put down,
however, to a problem with the composition of the
sample, as the representation of export-oriented sectors
among the largest firms declined. It should also be noted
that when these sectors are excluded, average export
ratios rose slightly between the years concerned. If non-
Mercosur export ratios are taken, however, the
conclusions from this comparison are reversed.
Where import levels are concerned, the average
ratio of multinational firms was more than double that
of domestic ones in 1997 (table 2). In a context of freer
trade, the tendency towards global sourcing6 and the
greater ease with which multinationals can supplement
the output of their local subsidiaries with products
imported from other subsidiaries largely accounts for
the propensity of multinationals to import more than
their local counterparts.
6 The global sourcing system involves a special relationship between
producer and supplier, in which the latter is in a position to supply
all of its customer’s plants wherever they may be. This may take
the form of centralized provision from a factory in a particular
country or decentralized provision from plants in the country where
the producer is operating.
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To verify more rigorously the hypothesis that the
external trade practices of multinationals are different
from those of locally owned firms, we proceeded as
follows. Pairs of firms were selected from the 1,000
largest companies by sales, one of them locally owned
and the other foreign-owned. The companies in each
pair belonged to the same sector and differed in size
(as measured by sales) by no more than 15% in 1997.
This made it possible to compare the external trade
performance of multinationals with that of an
appropriate control group, removing the biases that
differences of sector and size can introduce (table 3).
What this exercise shows, confirming the findings
set forth previously, is that multinational companies
export and import more in relation to sales than
domestic ones, but that while the latter export more
than they import, the opposite is true of multinationals.
The exercise described above also allows us to ascertain
whether the differences in export/import orientation
between multinational and local companies are
statistically significant or not. The answer is that they
are where import orientation is concerned, but not
where export orientation is concerned. In other words,
while the statistical evidence supports the theory that
TABLE 2
Argentina: Trade balance and export and import ratios
by sector and origin of capital, 1992 and 1997
Trade balance Export ratio Import ratio
Sector 1997 1992 1997 1997
LCa MCa LC MC LC MC LC MC
Total 5,042 803 12.9 17.6 10.2 15 8 18.8
Total excluding commoditiesb 991 -4,943 4.2 6.7 4.2 8.1 8.5 20.2
Oils and grains 2,373 4,570 62.1 88.4 63.4 84.5 1.1 1
Food, beverages and tobacco 246 -18 5.6 5.9 7 7.3 4.2 9.5
Cars and car parts -9 -335 4.7 11.1 2.6 24.8 10.7 31.7
Cellulose and paper -83 -14 6.7 4.3 5 15.1 20.6 17.2
Fuels and derivatives thereof 1,574 -87 8.6 3.1 14.2 4.8 7.3 7.4
Import trade with technical assistance component -41 -471 0 4 0.8 4.7 11.9 41.2
Wholesale and retail trade -527 -675 0.1 1 1.4 0.1 8.3 32.1
Construction and engineering -56 -9 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.1 2.1 2.9
Leather and manufactures thereof 450 194 67.8 64.5 76.5 76.2 12.2 8.3
Publishing/graphics industry -77 -35 7.4 0.4 4.7 2.9 10.2 19.7
Electricity, gas and water 0 -134 0 – 0 0.8 0.1 5.1
Household electrical/consumer electronics -227 -207 0.4 0.1 2.2 10 30.5 38.3
Pharmaceutical industry -68 -518 2.3 4 9.8 6 12.7 33.5
Meat products 468 143 37.3 53.9 26.3 44.1 4.1 1.8
Plastics and rubber products industry -54 -170 7.8 2.3 15.8 11.2 16.4 31.1
Electrical and electronic equipment and machinery 6 -383 6 7.3 24.3 7.5 0.7 34.6
Engineering and machinery -89 -194 6.9 12.5 5.2 10.3 13.1 30.1
Mining -11 -3 1.2 0 1 63.3 6.7 58.5
Fisheries 94 137 57.8 64.7 56.9 87.7 1.2 2.9
Petroleum 417 522 10.4 15.4 45.1 45.3 4.3 1.6
Chemicals and petrochemicals 37 -757 18.5 11.8 23.7 14.6 20.3 27.2
Telephony services – -774 0 0 – 0.1 – 24.2
Iron, steel and aluminium 520 – 8.1 – 22.5 – 12.4 –
Textiles and wearing apparel 47 -6 3.6 14.4 5.7 17.5 11.2 32.1
Commodities marketing 249 180 57.3 81.2 47.9 81.6 5 2.9
Transport and storage -115 -71 0.1 0 0 0 5 3
Television and multimedia -8 -67 0 – 0 0 6.8 7.4
Glass and non-metallic minerals -49 -10 5.2 6.2 6.2 9.1 9.3 10.2
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Argentine external trade statistics and data from Mercado and Prensa Económica magazines.
a LC = local companies, MC = multinational companies.
b Excludes oils and grains, leather and manufactures thereof, meat products, fisheries, petroleum and commodities marketing.
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multinationals tend to import more than local firms,
the same does not hold true for exports.
Geographically, the external trading pattern of the
subsidiaries of multinationals7 is quite similar to the
external trading pattern of Argentina generally. In 1997,
a greater proportion of these companies’ exports than
of total Argentine exports went to Mercosur, with a
smaller proportion therefore going to NAFTA, East Asia
and the European Union. As for imports, there was a
slight tendency for multinationals to import less from
East Asia and NAFTA and to import disproportionately
from the “rest of the world” and Europe (table 4, p. 162).
When the export patterns of multinationals and the
wider national economy are compared we find, firstly,
that multinationals tended to export more commodities
(particularly agricultural ones) and less industrial
goods,8 although the differences from the general
pattern of the economy are not very significant (table 5,
p. 162). Within the industrial goods category, it is found
that multinationals exported more natural resource-
based products, agricultural products once again being
preponderant.
It might be thought that the classification used, by
grouping all agricultural or agro-industrial products in
a single category, could be masking the possibility that
multinationals might be exporting products that are
more sophisticated, either technically or in terms of the
market niche they are aimed at, than those of local
companies within these groupings. This does not seem
to be the case in Argentina, however. There, about 85%
of multinationals’ agricultural commodity exports are
wheat, maize and soya. These are obviously the type
of products that have long been the country’s traditional
export staples. In the case of agro-industrial
manufactures, the bulk of these are flours and oils,
which have been one of the country’s largest export
categories for two decades (over 80% of multinationals’
exports in this category are of these products).
As for manufactures, multinationals export few
labour-intensive products, and most of their exports are
from industries in which economies of scale are
important. Of these, the greatest contribution is made
by the automotive industry, which accounts for over
80% of exports in this group. In 1997, multinationals
were less likely than the rest of the economy to export
manufactures requiring the use of skills or know-how
(specialized suppliers and research and development-
intensive industries). Again, the automotive complex
(engines and engine parts) also weighs heavily in the
exports of the specialized suppliers group, generating
about 70% of its external sales. When this is considered
along with the importance of this complex for exports
involving economies of scale, it can be seen that it is
essentially through the automotive industry that
multinational companies participate in Argentine
industrial exports.
What happens when the composition of
multinationals’ trade flows is analysed by region
(table 6, p. 163)? In the case of exports, it transpires
that Mercosur is the leading destination for exports of
non-natural resource-based industrial products. In fact,
Mercosur and LAIA between them take about 90% of
these exports. Exports of commodities and natural
resource-intensive manufactures display a different
geographical pattern, although Mercosur is important
once again as a destination market, particularly in the
case of mining- and energy-related products. Countries
that do not form part of any regional grouping (“rest of
TABLE 3
Argentina: Comparison of transnational and




No. of pairs 88 115
Average (%) 15 15
– Multinational companies 16 20
– Local companies 13 10
Standardized difference (%) 24 58
Z value 1.59 5.24
Statistically significant at 5% No Yes
Statistically significant at 1% No Yes
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Argentine external
trade statistics and data from Mercado and Prensa Económica
magazines.
7 To process the information on the geographical pattern and
composition of multinationals’ trade, a sample of the 140 largest
multinationals with production operations in the country was put
together. This group therefore excluded multinationals that were
exclusively importers and those specializing purely in trade and
services. The exports of this smaller sample accounted for 22% and
33%, respectively, of all Argentine exports in 1992 and 1997, and
for 21% of Argentine imports in 1997. In relation to the entire range
of multinationals, this sample accounted for 66% and 71% of exports
in 1992 and 1997, respectively, and for 36% of imports in 1997.
8 The classification employed is useful for depicting the pattern of
specialization by multinationals in terms of technology content,
factor intensity and the degree of industrialization of the goods
marketed by them. This classification was developed by CTP-Data
group (Universities of Paris I, XI and XIII) on the basis of Pavitt’s
traditional classification (1984), which was subsequently adapted
by Guerrieri and Milana (1989) and Guerrieri (1992).
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TABLE 4
Argentina: Exports and imports by economic area of destination, 1997
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Exports Imports
Multinationals Argentina Multinationals Argentina
Economic area Value % Value % Value % Value %
Total 8,779 100.0 26,357 100.0 5,899 100.0 28,487 100.0
LAIAa 791 9.0 3,134 11.9 150 2.5 1,050 3.7
Mercosurb 3,618 41.2 9,466 35.9 1,449 24.6 7,213 25.3
NAFTAc 342 3.9 2,445 9.3 1,268 21.5 6,634 23.3
Rest of world 2,148 24.5 4,643 17.6 798 13.5 2,203 7.7
East Asiad 727 8.3 2,730 10.4 350 5.9 3,558 12.5
European Unione 1,153 13.1 3,939 14.9 1,883 31.9 7,828 27.5
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of external trade statistics.
a Latin American Integration Association (excluding Mexico and Mercosur).
b Southern Common Market.
c North American Free Trade Agreement.




Argentina: Exports by product type, 1997
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Exports
Multinationals Argentina
Sector Total % Total %
Total 8,779 100.0 26,357 100.0
Subtotal 8,754 99.7 26,317 99.8
1. Commodities 2,842 32.4 8,335 31.6
1.10 Agricultural 2,433 27.7 5,916 22.4
1.20 Mining 0 0.0 114 0.4
1.30 Energy 409 4.7 2,305 8.7
2. Industrial products 5,912 67.3 17,982 6.2
2.1 Natural resource-intensive industries 3,353 38.2 9,619 36.5
2.11 Labour-intensive agricultural industries 2,831 32.2 6,913 26.2
2.12 Other agricultural resource-intensive industries 119 1.4 860 3.3
2.13 Mining 144 1.6 832 3.2
2.14 Energy 259 2.9 1,006 3.8
2.2 Manufactures 2,559 29.2 8,362 31.7
2.22 Labour-intensive industries 92 1.1 2,048 7.8
2.23 Industries that exploit economies of scale 1,838 20.9 4,303 16.3
2.24 Specialized suppliers 370 4.2 1,133 4.3
2.25 R&D-intensive industries 259 2.9 881 3.3
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of external trade statistics and Porta and Anllo (1998).
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the world”), and to a lesser extent the European Union
and South-East Asia, are the main recipients of
agriculture-related goods, while NAFTA is a significant
purchaser of mining/energy products exported by the
subsidiaries of multinational companies in Argentina.
In other words, multinationals export their most
sophisticated products (in terms of technology and
production techniques) to the Latin American countries,
particularly Mercosur, while what they sell to the
developed countries are mainly commodities or natural
resource-intensive manufactures.
What about imports? The pattern clearly has the
opposite tendency to the one described for exports.
Mercosur is important as a source of imports for the
subsidiaries of multinationals in almost all industries,
but particularly in the case of commodities and
agriculture-linked manufactures. By contrast,
manufacturing imports, and especially those included
in the specialized suppliers and R&D-intensive
categories, tend to come mainly from the European
Union and the NAFTA countries.
Lastly, it is interesting to analyse the extent to
which the external trade of multinationals is conducted
with the home countries of their respective parent
companies. In the case of exports, these home countries
are of very little importance as destination markets. In
1997, only Brazilian and Chilean companies showed
some tendency to export disproportionately to their
respective home countries. In all other cases, the
percentage of exports sent by subsidiaries to the
countries in which their parent companies were located
was generally between zero and 3%. The situation is
no different if the regional blocs to which the home
countries of parent companies belong are considered.
Thus, neither NAFTA nor the European Union were
export destinations of any particular importance for
Canadian or United States companies, in the former
case, or European ones, in the latter.
TABLE 6
Argentina: Geographical distribution of external trade conducted by the subsidiaries
of multinational companies, by product type, 1997
(Percentages)
LAIA Mercosur NAFTA RW SE ASIA EU Total
X M X M X M X M X M X M X M
Total 9.0 2.5 41.2 24.6 3.9 21.5 24.5 13.5 8.3 5.9 13.1 31.9 100.0 100.0
1. Commodities 11.4 7.7 28.4 19.5 3.3 5.6 34.9 54.4 10.9 10.1 11.1 2.6 100.0 100.0
1.10 Agricultural 9.9 7.4 22.5 44.9 1.5 11.8 40.8 7.3 12.3 23.3 13.0 5.3 100.0 100.0
1.20 Mining 25.2 0.2 20.7 10.3 50.9 26.4 3.3 44.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 18.3 100.0 100.0
1.30 Energy 19.9 8.2 63.4 0.0 14.1 0.2 0.0 91.6 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
2. Industrial products 7.9 2.4 47.2 24.7 4.2 21.9 19.6 12.2 7.05.8 14.2 33.1 100.0 100.0
2.1 Natural resource-
intensive industries 7.9 5.9 17.9 18.5 5.5 29.0 32.9 12.9 11.9 4.6 24.0 29.2 100.0 100.0
2.11 Labour-intensive
agricultural
industries 7.9 12.8 12.2 24.7 3.6 32.4 36.6 4.0 13.3 2.0 26.4 24.1 100.0 100.0
2.12 Other agricultural
resource-intensive
industries 12.0 2.6 29.8 58.6 7.3 15.9 14.6 2.0 10.5 0.1 25.8 20.7 100.0 100.0
2.13 Mining 11.1 4.9 44.0 15.6 13.3 32.8 23.6 10.8 5.3 4.8 2.7 31.2 100.0 100.0
2.14 Energy 4.5 6.5 59.9 6.3 21.6 8.4 5.2 43.1 0.2 8.7 8.8 27.0 100.0 100.0
2.2 Manufactures 7.7 1.5 85.6 26.1 2.5 20.3 2.1 12.0 0.7 6.1 1.3 34.0 100.0 100.0
2.22 Labour-intensive
industries 23.8 3.1 64.2 31.8 1.2 23.7 6.7 14.4 0.0 7.1 4.0 19.9 100.0 100.0
2.23 Industries that
exploit economies
of scale 5.2 2.1 89.9 34.3 1.9 17.5 1.8 9.6 0.7 6.5 0.6 30.0 100.0 100.0
2.24 Specialized suppliers 5.6 1.1 82.6 17.8 5.4 22.6 2.3 12.1 0.6 4.6 3.6 41.7 100.0 100.0
2.25 R&D-intensive
industries 23.5 0.3 67.5 15.5 3.1 22.8 2.3 17.2 1.4 7.1 2.3 37.1 100.0 100.0
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of external trade statistics.
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The picture changes when the imports of
companies in the sample are analysed. The
proportion of imports coming from the home
countries of subsidiaries’ parent companies in 1997
was 61% for Brazil, 60% for France, 54% for Japan,
42% for Switzerland, 36% for Germany, 32% for
Great Britain and almost 30% for the United States
and Canada. Again, NAFTA was the source for 80%
of Canadian companies’ imports, and the European
Union for 91% of Belgian companies’, for example.
By contrast with the situation for exports, in other
words, there is quite a clear association in many cases
between the origin of multinationals and the origin
of their imports.
IV
General conclusions and policy
suggestions
Let us return to the questions asked in the introduction
to this article. Do the strategies and objectives of
multinational companies in an open economy differ
from those seen during the ISI phase? Yes, but not as
much as might be imagined, considering how the
ground rules changed in the 1990s.
The basic objective of subsidiaries of
multinationals in Argentina is still to exploit the
domestic market. It is clear, however, that there are two
substantial differences from the ISI phase: access to the
Brazilian market under Mercosur has made greater
economies of scale and specialization possible, and
increased competition in many tradable sectors is
forcing subsidiaries to bring their production operations
more into line with international best practice.
These differences are not reflected, however, in the
trading patterns of subsidiaries, which the findings of
this study suggest are not much different from what
they were under ISI.
Manufacturing exports, which are only a small
proportion of total sales, go mainly to Mercosur; exports
to the developed countries consist essentially of
commodities and natural resource-based manufactures
with a low degree of processing. Manufacturing
imports, and particularly more technologically complex
ones, come mainly from the developed countries,
largely from the home country or region of the
subsidiary’s parent company.
Other than in a few industries that exploit
economies of scale (essentially the automotive sector,
where the prevailing regime has encouraged the
regionalization of Argentine subsidiaries),
multinationals’ exports are essentially based on the use
of resources. There are almost no exports of R&D-based
goods or products from specialized suppliers. Thus,
rather than being agents of change in the pattern of
export specialization, multinationals have generally
helped entrench the traditional composition.
Although the subsidiaries of multinationals have
substantially higher import ratios than local firms,
which ought to give them cost and quality advantages
(where purchases of inputs and capital goods are
concerned) or advantages of scale and scope (when
finished products are imported), the differences in their
respective export ratios are not statistically significant
when sector and size are adjusted for. In fact,
multinationals’ exports outside Mercosur as a
proportion of total sales fell between 1992 and 1997:
in the latter year, only a little over 4% of multinationals’
sales were exports of this kind, while their export ratio
barely exceeded 8%.9 This would suggest that
multinationals have not helped increase the access of
Argentine products to outside markets, considering that
Mercosur became a “natural” market for Argentine
exports in the 1990s.
It could be argued that FDI helped to increase
Argentine exports indirectly, e.g., through investment
in communications, energy and transport infrastructure,
but this effect does not seem to have been very
substantial in the 1990s. In fact, although exports grew
strongly during that decade, largely because of
9 Another interesting fact is that, according to estimates by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Department of
Commerce, if the exports of subsidiaries of United States
multinationals in Argentina in 1983 and 1998 are compared, no
increase whatsoever is seen in the average ratio of exports to sales
between the two years.
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increased external sales by sectors with natural
comparative advantages (cereals, oilseeds, oils and
petroleum, and activities strongly supported by the
public sector, such as car manufacturing),10 exports did
not rise significantly as a proportion of GDP, and this
proportion is still low by international standards (the
export/GDP ratio rose from 7.8% in 1991-1995 to 10.4%
in 1996-1999).
While stand-alone operations are still usual among
the subsidiaries of multinationals, there has been a shift
towards integration strategies. These, however, are
generally of the “simple” type, and in most cases links
with the company are weak. Only in the automotive
complex has there been more vigorous integration of
subsidiaries (basically within Mercosur) owing both to
public policies and to the global strategies of
multinationals, although invariably, as in other sectors,
local subsidiaries have little independence and
innovation and strategic activities are almost never
decentralized.
Thus, there is as yet no sign in Argentina of the
tendencies that, according to the literature examined,
should be leading multinationals to implement new,
more active strategies to integrate their subsidiaries into
intracompany trade, production and technology
networks. In particular, innovation and strategic
management activities are not being decentralized, and
there is no move towards the sort of “world product
mandates” that would give subsidiaries exclusive
responsibility for worldwide sales of a particular
product, measures that entail a high degree of
independence for subsidiaries and that yield major
externalities for the recipient economy.
Taken all together, in short, the data examined in
the study suggest that the private gains accruing to the
“winners” among the country’s top companies from
improved microeconomic performance have not yet had
any major spillover effects in the Argentine economy.
This is amply illustrated by the low export ratios of the
subsidiaries of multinationals and by the limited
diversification of their destination markets and the low
degree of linkage seen hitherto between exports and
clearly defined intracompany specialization and
integration strategies. Although they have not been
specifically examined in this paper, the spillover effects
generated by multinationals up and down the country’s
production chains seem to be weak as well, as do the
effects on local technology efforts and the transfer of
efficiency gains to consumers in areas where the
discipline of trade liberalization is not enough to
promote competition.
Has FDI, then, helped the restructuring of the
Argentine economy to achieve the results expected
by its advocates? Clearly, more issues than have been
covered here would need to be analysed for this
question to be answered. To confine ourselves to what
has been dealt with in this article, however, we can
say that its contribution has at any rate been less than
might have been expected, considering both the new
situation in Argentina and the differences between the
way FDI works now and the way it worked during the
ISI phase.
What policy conclusions does this analysis yield?
The fact that many of the world’s leading multinationals
have operations in Argentina is certainly a useful asset
which, in our opinion, has not yet been sufficiently
capitalized upon to improve the country’s
competitiveness in a globalized economy. We do not
believe, therefore, that the only possible line of policy
is the one followed hitherto, i.e., increasing the general
attractiveness of the country for investors and trusting
that the performance of multinationals will produce
greater spillover effects as time passes and stability and
growth in the economy are secured.
This stance, the dominant one in Argentina, is
challenged by another current of thinking that
attributes to FDI (or, more vaguely, to globalization) a
variety of social costs, such as rising unemployment
or the bankruptcy of many local firms. According to
this view, the costs of FDI clearly exceed its benefits.
Certainly, the rationalization measures adopted by
multinationals have generally resulted in labour being
shed, and their rise has meant the closure of many
local firms that were unable to compete with them, or
could not meet the conditions of price, quality, etc.,
that they demanded of their suppliers. In our opinion,
though, these effects can mainly be put down to the
particular way in which the switch to the new
economic regulation model was made in the 1990s.
To offset costs of this type, it is better to adopt policies
that complement trade liberalization, something that
has long been put off in Argentina, than to reject the
participation of multinationals in the country’s
economy.
We believe, and international experience
suggests, that the potential contribution of FDI will
only be realized fully once a more “proactive”
10 About 75% of the increase in Argentine exports between 1990
and 1998 was due to higher sales of cereals, oilseeds, oils, leather,
fish products, fruit and vegetables, petroleum and cars.
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strategy has been adopted. A more aggressive export
promotion and market diversification policy,11
measures to attract investment projects with export
potential and initiatives by multinationals that boost
the development of local suppliers ought to be some
of the components of this “proactive” strategy, which
would have to be compatible with World Trade
Organization (WTO) rules and be designed with a view
to ensuring that trade and industrial policy
instruments do not consolidate situations of
inefficiency within the local production system, as
they did in the past.
In summary, there is a broad positive agenda for
policy towards multinationals. This agenda is more
active than the one followed by the national
Government in the 1990s but, unlike the one put forward
by “anti-globalization” movements, what it proposes
are not restrictions on the operations of multinationals
but measures to increase the benefits and reduce the
costs deriving from them. If this is done, the privilege
of belonging to the small club of developing countries
that attract large quantities of FDI will translate far more
clearly than it has so far into tangible benefits for
economic development in Argentina.
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